The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Pelbagai serangan terhadap RC5 telah dianalisis secara intensif. Serangan teks biasa yang diketahui belum dilaporkan bahawa ia berfungsi pada pusingan yang lebih tinggi sebagai serangan teks biasa yang dipilih, tetapi ia boleh berfungsi dengan lebih cekap dan praktikal. Dalam kertas ini, kami menyiasat serangan plaintext yang diketahui terhadap RC5 dengan menambah baik serangan korelasi. Bagi serangan plaintext yang diketahui terhadap RC5, hasil yang paling terkenal ialah analisis kriptografi linear. Mereka telah melaporkan bahawa RC5-32 dengan 10 pusingan boleh dipecahkan sebanyak 264 plainteks di bawah andaian heuristik: RC5-32 dengan r pusingan boleh dipecahkan dengan kebarangkalian kejayaan 90% dengan menggunakan 26r+4 plainteks. Walau bagaimanapun, andaian mereka nampaknya sangat optimistik. Serangan korelasi plaintext kami yang diketahui boleh memecahkan RC5-32 dengan 10 pusingan (20 pusingan separuh) dalam erti kata yang lebih ketat dengan kebarangkalian kejayaan 90% dengan menggunakan 263.67 plainteks. Tambahan pula, serangan kami boleh memecahkan RC5-32 dengan 21 separuh pusingan dalam kebarangkalian kejayaan 30% dengan menggunakan 263.07 plainteks.
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Salinan
Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, "Improved Correlation Attack on RC5" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E85-A, no. 1, pp. 44-57, January 2002, doi: .
Abstract: Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 264 plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 263.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 263.07 plaintexts.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e85-a_1_44/_p
Salinan
@ARTICLE{e85-a_1_44,
author={Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Improved Correlation Attack on RC5},
year={2002},
volume={E85-A},
number={1},
pages={44-57},
abstract={Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 264 plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 263.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 263.07 plaintexts.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
Salinan
TY - JOUR
TI - Improved Correlation Attack on RC5
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 44
EP - 57
AU - Atsuko MIYAJI
AU - Masao NONAKA
AU - Yoshinori TAKII
PY - 2002
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E85-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2002
AB - Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 264 plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 263.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 263.07 plaintexts.
ER -