The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Untuk mengekalkan perkhidmatan berasaskan blokchain dengan memastikan keselamatannya, adalah isu penting bagaimana untuk memutuskan ganjaran perlombongan supaya bilangan pelombong yang mengambil bahagian dalam perlombongan meningkat. Kami mencadangkan model dinamik membuat keputusan untuk pelombong menggunakan pendekatan permainan evolusi dan menganalisis kestabilan titik keseimbangan model yang dicadangkan. Model yang dicadangkan diterangkan oleh persamaan pembezaan tertib pertama. Jadi, ia mudah tetapi analisis teorinya memberi gambaran tentang ciri-ciri membuat keputusan. Melalui analisis titik keseimbangan, kami menunjukkan bifurkasi trankritik dan fenomena histerisis bagi titik keseimbangan. Kami juga mereka bentuk pengawal yang menentukan ganjaran perlombongan berdasarkan bilangan pelombong yang mengambil bahagian untuk menstabilkan keadaan di mana semua pelombong mengambil bahagian dalam perlombongan. Simulasi berangka menunjukkan bahawa terdapat pertukaran dalam pilihan parameter reka bentuk.
Kosuke TODA
Osaka University
Naomi KUZE
Osaka University
Toshimitsu USHIO
Osaka University
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Salinan
Kosuke TODA, Naomi KUZE, Toshimitsu USHIO, "Stability Analysis and Control of Decision-Making of Miners in Blockchain" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E105-A, no. 4, pp. 682-688, April 2022, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2021EAP1099.
Abstract: To maintain blockchain-based services with ensuring its security, it is an important issue how to decide a mining reward so that the number of miners participating in the mining increases. We propose a dynamical model of decision-making for miners using an evolutionary game approach and analyze the stability of equilibrium points of the proposed model. The proposed model is described by the 1st-order differential equation. So, it is simple but its theoretical analysis gives an insight into the characteristics of the decision-making. Through the analysis of the equilibrium points, we show the transcritical bifurcations and hysteresis phenomena of the equilibrium points. We also design a controller that determines the mining reward based on the number of participating miners to stabilize the state where all miners participate in the mining. Numerical simulation shows that there is a trade-off in the choice of the design parameters.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2021EAP1099/_p
Salinan
@ARTICLE{e105-a_4_682,
author={Kosuke TODA, Naomi KUZE, Toshimitsu USHIO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Stability Analysis and Control of Decision-Making of Miners in Blockchain},
year={2022},
volume={E105-A},
number={4},
pages={682-688},
abstract={To maintain blockchain-based services with ensuring its security, it is an important issue how to decide a mining reward so that the number of miners participating in the mining increases. We propose a dynamical model of decision-making for miners using an evolutionary game approach and analyze the stability of equilibrium points of the proposed model. The proposed model is described by the 1st-order differential equation. So, it is simple but its theoretical analysis gives an insight into the characteristics of the decision-making. Through the analysis of the equilibrium points, we show the transcritical bifurcations and hysteresis phenomena of the equilibrium points. We also design a controller that determines the mining reward based on the number of participating miners to stabilize the state where all miners participate in the mining. Numerical simulation shows that there is a trade-off in the choice of the design parameters.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2021EAP1099},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={April},}
Salinan
TY - JOUR
TI - Stability Analysis and Control of Decision-Making of Miners in Blockchain
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 682
EP - 688
AU - Kosuke TODA
AU - Naomi KUZE
AU - Toshimitsu USHIO
PY - 2022
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2021EAP1099
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E105-A
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - April 2022
AB - To maintain blockchain-based services with ensuring its security, it is an important issue how to decide a mining reward so that the number of miners participating in the mining increases. We propose a dynamical model of decision-making for miners using an evolutionary game approach and analyze the stability of equilibrium points of the proposed model. The proposed model is described by the 1st-order differential equation. So, it is simple but its theoretical analysis gives an insight into the characteristics of the decision-making. Through the analysis of the equilibrium points, we show the transcritical bifurcations and hysteresis phenomena of the equilibrium points. We also design a controller that determines the mining reward based on the number of participating miners to stabilize the state where all miners participate in the mining. Numerical simulation shows that there is a trade-off in the choice of the design parameters.
ER -