The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Dalam permainan kemudahan yang menjengkelkan, kami mereka bentuk mekanisme yang mengeluarkan lokasi kemudahan yang tidak diingini berdasarkan lokasi pemain yang dilaporkan sendiri. Faedah pemain ditakrifkan sebagai jarak antara lokasinya dan kemudahan. Seorang pemain boleh cuba memanipulasi output mekanisme dengan salah melaporkan lokasinya secara strategik. Kami ingin mereka bentuk mekanisme kalis strategi kumpulan λ iaitu, untuk setiap kumpulan pemain, sekurang-kurangnya seorang pemain dalam kumpulan itu tidak boleh mendapat lebih daripada λ kali ganda faedah utamanya dengan meminta seluruh kumpulan menukar laporan mereka secara serentak. Dalam kertas kerja ini, kami mereka bentuk a k-calon λ-kumpulan mekanisme kalis strategi untuk permainan kemudahan yang menjengkelkan dalam metrik yang ditakrifkan oleh k separuh garisan dengan titik akhir sepunya supaya setiap calon adalah satu titik dalam setiap setengah garisan pada jarak yang sama ke titik akhir sepunya seperti calon lain. Kemudian, kami menunjukkan bahawa nisbah faedah mekanisme adalah paling banyak 1+2/(k-1)λ. Akhirnya, kami membuktikan bahawa ikatan itu hampir ketat.
Yuhei FUKUI
Kyoto University
Aleksandar SHURBEVSKI
Kyoto University
Hiroshi NAGAMOCHI
Kyoto University
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Salinan
Yuhei FUKUI, Aleksandar SHURBEVSKI, Hiroshi NAGAMOCHI, "λ-Group Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for the Obnoxious Facility Game in Star Networks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E102-A, no. 9, pp. 1179-1186, September 2019, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E102.A.1179.
Abstract: In the obnoxious facility game, we design mechanisms that output a location of an undesirable facility based on the locations of players reported by themselves. The benefit of a player is defined to be the distance between her location and the facility. A player may try to manipulate the output of the mechanism by strategically misreporting her location. We wish to design a λ-group strategy-proof mechanism i.e., for every group of players, at least one player in the group cannot gain strictly more than λ times her primary benefit by having the entire group change their reports simultaneously. In this paper, we design a k-candidate λ-group strategy-proof mechanism for the obnoxious facility game in the metric defined by k half lines with a common endpoint such that each candidate is a point in each of the half-lines at the same distance to the common endpoint as other candidates. Then, we show that the benefit ratio of the mechanism is at most 1+2/(k-1)λ. Finally, we prove that the bound is nearly tight.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E102.A.1179/_p
Salinan
@ARTICLE{e102-a_9_1179,
author={Yuhei FUKUI, Aleksandar SHURBEVSKI, Hiroshi NAGAMOCHI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={λ-Group Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for the Obnoxious Facility Game in Star Networks},
year={2019},
volume={E102-A},
number={9},
pages={1179-1186},
abstract={In the obnoxious facility game, we design mechanisms that output a location of an undesirable facility based on the locations of players reported by themselves. The benefit of a player is defined to be the distance between her location and the facility. A player may try to manipulate the output of the mechanism by strategically misreporting her location. We wish to design a λ-group strategy-proof mechanism i.e., for every group of players, at least one player in the group cannot gain strictly more than λ times her primary benefit by having the entire group change their reports simultaneously. In this paper, we design a k-candidate λ-group strategy-proof mechanism for the obnoxious facility game in the metric defined by k half lines with a common endpoint such that each candidate is a point in each of the half-lines at the same distance to the common endpoint as other candidates. Then, we show that the benefit ratio of the mechanism is at most 1+2/(k-1)λ. Finally, we prove that the bound is nearly tight.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E102.A.1179},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={September},}
Salinan
TY - JOUR
TI - λ-Group Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for the Obnoxious Facility Game in Star Networks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1179
EP - 1186
AU - Yuhei FUKUI
AU - Aleksandar SHURBEVSKI
AU - Hiroshi NAGAMOCHI
PY - 2019
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E102.A.1179
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E102-A
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - September 2019
AB - In the obnoxious facility game, we design mechanisms that output a location of an undesirable facility based on the locations of players reported by themselves. The benefit of a player is defined to be the distance between her location and the facility. A player may try to manipulate the output of the mechanism by strategically misreporting her location. We wish to design a λ-group strategy-proof mechanism i.e., for every group of players, at least one player in the group cannot gain strictly more than λ times her primary benefit by having the entire group change their reports simultaneously. In this paper, we design a k-candidate λ-group strategy-proof mechanism for the obnoxious facility game in the metric defined by k half lines with a common endpoint such that each candidate is a point in each of the half-lines at the same distance to the common endpoint as other candidates. Then, we show that the benefit ratio of the mechanism is at most 1+2/(k-1)λ. Finally, we prove that the bound is nearly tight.
ER -