The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Penyulitan homomorfik (HE) berguna untuk menganalisis data yang disulitkan tanpa menyahsulitnya. Walau bagaimanapun, dengan menggunakan HE biasa, pengguna yang boleh menyahsulit teks sifir yang dijana dengan melaksanakan operasi homomorfik, juga boleh menyahsulit teks sifir yang penilaian homomorfik belum dilakukan, kerana operasi homomorfik tidak boleh dilaksanakan antara teks sifir yang disulitkan di bawah kunci awam yang berbeza. . Untuk menyelesaikan masalah di atas, kami memperkenalkan primitif kriptografi baharu yang dipanggil Penyulitan Semula Proksi Homomorphic (HPRE) yang menggabungkan sifat "penukaran kunci" Penyulitan Semula Proksi (PRE) dan sifat homomorfik HE. Dalam HPRE kami, siferteks asal (yang belum disulitkan semula) menjamin keselamatan CCA2 (dan khususnya memenuhi kebolehtempaan). Sebaliknya, teks sifir yang disulitkan semula hanya menjamin keselamatan CPA, supaya operasi homomorfik boleh dilakukan padanya. Kami mentakrifkan keperluan fungsi/keselamatan HPRE, dan kemudian mencadangkan pembinaan khusus yang menyokong operasi kumpulan (di atas kumpulan sasaran dalam kumpulan bilinear) berdasarkan skim PRE oleh Libert dan Vergnaud (PKC 2008) dan skim penyulitan kunci awam selamat CCA oleh Lai et al. (CT-RSA 2010), dan buktikan keselamatannya dalam model standard. Selain itu, kami menunjukkan dua sambungan skim HPRE kami untuk operasi kumpulan: skim HPRE untuk Selain itu dan skim HPRE untuk darjah-2 polinomial (di mana bilangan darjah-2 sebutan adalah malar), dengan menggunakan teknik kerja terbaru oleh Catalano dan Fiore (ACMCCS 2015).
Yutaka KAWAI
Mitsubishi Electric
Takahiro MATSUDA
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
Takato HIRANO
Mitsubishi Electric
Yoshihiro KOSEKI
Mitsubishi Electric
Goichiro HANAOKA
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
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Salinan
Yutaka KAWAI, Takahiro MATSUDA, Takato HIRANO, Yoshihiro KOSEKI, Goichiro HANAOKA, "Proxy Re-Encryption That Supports Homomorphic Operations for Re-Encrypted Ciphertexts" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E102-A, no. 1, pp. 81-98, January 2019, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E102.A.81.
Abstract: Homomorphic encryption (HE) is useful to analyze encrypted data without decrypting it. However, by using ordinary HE, a user who can decrypt a ciphertext that is generated by executing homomorphic operations, can also decrypt ciphertexts on which homomorphic evaluations have not been performed, since homomorphic operations cannot be executed among ciphertexts which are encrypted under different public keys. To resolve the above problem, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive called Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption (HPRE) combining the “key-switching” property of Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) and the homomorphic property of HE. In our HPRE, original ciphertexts (which have not been re-encrypted) guarantee CCA2 security (and in particular satisfy non-malleability). On the other hand, re-encrypted ciphertexts only guarantee CPA security, so that homomorphic operations can be performed on them. We define the functional/security requirements of HPRE, and then propose a specific construction supporting the group operation (over the target group in bilinear groups) based on the PRE scheme by Libert and Vergnaud (PKC 2008) and the CCA secure public key encryption scheme by Lai et al. (CT-RSA 2010), and prove its security in the standard model. Additionally, we show two extensions of our HPRE scheme for the group operation: an HPRE scheme for addition and an HPRE scheme for degree-2 polynomials (in which the number of degree-2 terms is constant), by using the technique of the recent work by Catalano and Fiore (ACMCCS 2015).
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E102.A.81/_p
Salinan
@ARTICLE{e102-a_1_81,
author={Yutaka KAWAI, Takahiro MATSUDA, Takato HIRANO, Yoshihiro KOSEKI, Goichiro HANAOKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Proxy Re-Encryption That Supports Homomorphic Operations for Re-Encrypted Ciphertexts},
year={2019},
volume={E102-A},
number={1},
pages={81-98},
abstract={Homomorphic encryption (HE) is useful to analyze encrypted data without decrypting it. However, by using ordinary HE, a user who can decrypt a ciphertext that is generated by executing homomorphic operations, can also decrypt ciphertexts on which homomorphic evaluations have not been performed, since homomorphic operations cannot be executed among ciphertexts which are encrypted under different public keys. To resolve the above problem, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive called Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption (HPRE) combining the “key-switching” property of Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) and the homomorphic property of HE. In our HPRE, original ciphertexts (which have not been re-encrypted) guarantee CCA2 security (and in particular satisfy non-malleability). On the other hand, re-encrypted ciphertexts only guarantee CPA security, so that homomorphic operations can be performed on them. We define the functional/security requirements of HPRE, and then propose a specific construction supporting the group operation (over the target group in bilinear groups) based on the PRE scheme by Libert and Vergnaud (PKC 2008) and the CCA secure public key encryption scheme by Lai et al. (CT-RSA 2010), and prove its security in the standard model. Additionally, we show two extensions of our HPRE scheme for the group operation: an HPRE scheme for addition and an HPRE scheme for degree-2 polynomials (in which the number of degree-2 terms is constant), by using the technique of the recent work by Catalano and Fiore (ACMCCS 2015).},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E102.A.81},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
Salinan
TY - JOUR
TI - Proxy Re-Encryption That Supports Homomorphic Operations for Re-Encrypted Ciphertexts
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 81
EP - 98
AU - Yutaka KAWAI
AU - Takahiro MATSUDA
AU - Takato HIRANO
AU - Yoshihiro KOSEKI
AU - Goichiro HANAOKA
PY - 2019
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E102.A.81
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E102-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2019
AB - Homomorphic encryption (HE) is useful to analyze encrypted data without decrypting it. However, by using ordinary HE, a user who can decrypt a ciphertext that is generated by executing homomorphic operations, can also decrypt ciphertexts on which homomorphic evaluations have not been performed, since homomorphic operations cannot be executed among ciphertexts which are encrypted under different public keys. To resolve the above problem, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive called Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption (HPRE) combining the “key-switching” property of Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) and the homomorphic property of HE. In our HPRE, original ciphertexts (which have not been re-encrypted) guarantee CCA2 security (and in particular satisfy non-malleability). On the other hand, re-encrypted ciphertexts only guarantee CPA security, so that homomorphic operations can be performed on them. We define the functional/security requirements of HPRE, and then propose a specific construction supporting the group operation (over the target group in bilinear groups) based on the PRE scheme by Libert and Vergnaud (PKC 2008) and the CCA secure public key encryption scheme by Lai et al. (CT-RSA 2010), and prove its security in the standard model. Additionally, we show two extensions of our HPRE scheme for the group operation: an HPRE scheme for addition and an HPRE scheme for degree-2 polynomials (in which the number of degree-2 terms is constant), by using the technique of the recent work by Catalano and Fiore (ACMCCS 2015).
ER -