The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Kerja ini memfokuskan pada kerentanan fungsi cincang akibat penggunaan atau pelaksanaan yang ceroboh dalam dunia nyata. Jika komuniti penyelidikan kriptografi kami berjaya membangunkan fungsi rawak yang selamat dengan sempurna sebagai oracle rawak, ia mungkin rosak dalam erti kata tertentu oleh penggunaan yang tidak sah. Dalam makalah ini, kami mencadangkan varian baharu model oracle rawak untuk menganalisis keselamatan protokol kriptografi di bawah situasi penggunaan fungsi cincang yang tidak sah. Model kami membenarkan lawan mendapatkan kandungan senarai cincang pasangan input dan output secara sewenang-wenangnya. Selain itu, kami menganalisis keselamatan beberapa protokol lazim (FDH, OAEP, sistem kripto Cramer-Shoup, sistem kripto Kurosawa-Desmedt, NAXOS) dalam model kami. Hasil daripada analisis, kami menjelaskan bahawa sistem kripto FDH dan Cramer-Shoup masih selamat tetapi yang lain tidak selamat dalam model kami. Keputusan ini menunjukkan pemisahan antara model kami dan model standard.
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Salinan
Kazuki YONEYAMA, Satoshi MIYAGAWA, Kazuo OHTA, "Leaky Random Oracle" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 8, pp. 1795-1807, August 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.1795.
Abstract: This work focuses on a vulnerability of hash functions due to sloppy usages or implementations in the real world. If our cryptographic research community succeeded in the development of a perfectly secure random function as the random oracle, it might be broken in some sense by invalid uses. In this paper, we propose a new variant of the random oracle model in order to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols under the situation of an invalid use of hash functions. Our model allows adversaries to obtain contents of the hash list of input and output pairs arbitrarily. Also, we analyze the security of several prevailing protocols (FDH, OAEP, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystem, NAXOS) in our model. As the result of analyses, we clarify that FDH and Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem are still secure but others are insecure in our model. This result shows the separation between our model and the standard model.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.1795/_p
Salinan
@ARTICLE{e92-a_8_1795,
author={Kazuki YONEYAMA, Satoshi MIYAGAWA, Kazuo OHTA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Leaky Random Oracle},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={8},
pages={1795-1807},
abstract={This work focuses on a vulnerability of hash functions due to sloppy usages or implementations in the real world. If our cryptographic research community succeeded in the development of a perfectly secure random function as the random oracle, it might be broken in some sense by invalid uses. In this paper, we propose a new variant of the random oracle model in order to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols under the situation of an invalid use of hash functions. Our model allows adversaries to obtain contents of the hash list of input and output pairs arbitrarily. Also, we analyze the security of several prevailing protocols (FDH, OAEP, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystem, NAXOS) in our model. As the result of analyses, we clarify that FDH and Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem are still secure but others are insecure in our model. This result shows the separation between our model and the standard model.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.1795},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={August},}
Salinan
TY - JOUR
TI - Leaky Random Oracle
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1795
EP - 1807
AU - Kazuki YONEYAMA
AU - Satoshi MIYAGAWA
AU - Kazuo OHTA
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.1795
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 8
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - August 2009
AB - This work focuses on a vulnerability of hash functions due to sloppy usages or implementations in the real world. If our cryptographic research community succeeded in the development of a perfectly secure random function as the random oracle, it might be broken in some sense by invalid uses. In this paper, we propose a new variant of the random oracle model in order to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols under the situation of an invalid use of hash functions. Our model allows adversaries to obtain contents of the hash list of input and output pairs arbitrarily. Also, we analyze the security of several prevailing protocols (FDH, OAEP, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystem, NAXOS) in our model. As the result of analyses, we clarify that FDH and Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem are still secure but others are insecure in our model. This result shows the separation between our model and the standard model.
ER -