The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Rantai imbasan ialah salah satu teknik ujian yang paling penting, tetapi ia boleh digunakan sebagai serangan saluran sisi terhadap LSI kriptografi. Kami menumpukan pada serangan berasaskan imbasan, di mana rantai imbasan disasarkan untuk serangan saluran sisi. Serangan berasaskan imbasan konvensional hanya mempertimbangkan rantaian imbasan yang hanya terdiri daripada daftar dalam litar kriptografi. Walau bagaimanapun, LSI kriptografi biasanya menggunakan banyak litar seperti memori, pemproses mikro dan litar lain. Ini bermakna bahawa serangan konvensional tidak boleh digunakan pada rantai imbasan praktikal yang terdiri daripada pelbagai jenis daftar. Dalam kertas ini, serangan berasaskan imbasan yang membolehkan untuk mentafsir kunci rahsia dalam kriptografi AES LSI yang terdiri daripada litar AES dan litar lain dicadangkan. Dengan memfokuskan pada corak bit daftar tertentu dan memantau perubahannya, serangan berasaskan imbasan kami menghapuskan pengaruh daftar yang disertakan dalam litar lain selain AES. Serangan kami tidak bergantung pada seni bina rantai imbasan, dan ia boleh mentafsir LSI kriptografi AES yang praktikal.
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Salinan
Ryuta NARA, Nozomu TOGAWA, Masao YANAGISAWA, Tatsuo OHTSUKI, "A Scan-Based Attack Based on Discriminators for AES Cryptosystems" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 12, pp. 3229-3237, December 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.3229.
Abstract: A scan chain is one of the most important testing techniques, but it can be used as side-channel attacks against a cryptography LSI. We focus on scan-based attacks, in which scan chains are targeted for side-channel attacks. The conventional scan-based attacks only consider the scan chain composed of only the registers in a cryptography circuit. However, a cryptography LSI usually uses many circuits such as memories, micro processors and other circuits. This means that the conventional attacks cannot be applied to the practical scan chain composed of various types of registers. In this paper, a scan-based attack which enables to decipher the secret key in an AES cryptography LSI composed of an AES circuit and other circuits is proposed. By focusing on bit pattern of the specific register and monitoring its change, our scan-based attack eliminates the influence of registers included in other circuits than AES. Our attack does not depend on scan chain architecture, and it can decipher practical AES cryptography LSIs.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.3229/_p
Salinan
@ARTICLE{e92-a_12_3229,
author={Ryuta NARA, Nozomu TOGAWA, Masao YANAGISAWA, Tatsuo OHTSUKI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={A Scan-Based Attack Based on Discriminators for AES Cryptosystems},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={12},
pages={3229-3237},
abstract={A scan chain is one of the most important testing techniques, but it can be used as side-channel attacks against a cryptography LSI. We focus on scan-based attacks, in which scan chains are targeted for side-channel attacks. The conventional scan-based attacks only consider the scan chain composed of only the registers in a cryptography circuit. However, a cryptography LSI usually uses many circuits such as memories, micro processors and other circuits. This means that the conventional attacks cannot be applied to the practical scan chain composed of various types of registers. In this paper, a scan-based attack which enables to decipher the secret key in an AES cryptography LSI composed of an AES circuit and other circuits is proposed. By focusing on bit pattern of the specific register and monitoring its change, our scan-based attack eliminates the influence of registers included in other circuits than AES. Our attack does not depend on scan chain architecture, and it can decipher practical AES cryptography LSIs.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.3229},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={December},}
Salinan
TY - JOUR
TI - A Scan-Based Attack Based on Discriminators for AES Cryptosystems
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 3229
EP - 3237
AU - Ryuta NARA
AU - Nozomu TOGAWA
AU - Masao YANAGISAWA
AU - Tatsuo OHTSUKI
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.3229
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 12
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - December 2009
AB - A scan chain is one of the most important testing techniques, but it can be used as side-channel attacks against a cryptography LSI. We focus on scan-based attacks, in which scan chains are targeted for side-channel attacks. The conventional scan-based attacks only consider the scan chain composed of only the registers in a cryptography circuit. However, a cryptography LSI usually uses many circuits such as memories, micro processors and other circuits. This means that the conventional attacks cannot be applied to the practical scan chain composed of various types of registers. In this paper, a scan-based attack which enables to decipher the secret key in an AES cryptography LSI composed of an AES circuit and other circuits is proposed. By focusing on bit pattern of the specific register and monitoring its change, our scan-based attack eliminates the influence of registers included in other circuits than AES. Our attack does not depend on scan chain architecture, and it can decipher practical AES cryptography LSIs.
ER -