The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Makalah ini menerangkan serangan analisis kesalahan pembezaan (DFA) terhadap CLEFIA. Serangan yang dicadangkan boleh digunakan pada CLEFIA dengan semua kekunci yang disokong: kekunci 128, 192 dan 256-bit. DFA ialah sejenis serangan saluran sisi. Serangan ini membolehkan pemulihan kunci rahsia dengan menyuntik kerosakan ke dalam peranti selamat semasa pengiraan algoritma kriptografi dan membandingkan teks sifir yang betul dengan yang rosak. CLEFIA ialah 128-bit blockcipher dengan kekunci 128, 192, dan 256-bit yang dibangunkan oleh Sony Corporation pada tahun 2007. CLEFIA menggunakan struktur Feistel umum dengan empat talian data. Kami membangunkan kaedah serangan baharu yang menggunakan struktur ciri algoritma CLEFIA ini. Berdasarkan serangan yang dicadangkan, hanya 2 pasang ciphertext yang betul dan rosak diperlukan untuk mendapatkan semula kunci 128-bit, dan 10.78 pasangan secara purata diperlukan untuk mendapatkan semula kunci 192 dan 256-bit. Serangan yang dicadangkan adalah lebih cekap daripada mana-mana yang dilaporkan sebelum ini. Untuk mengesahkan serangan yang dicadangkan dan menganggarkan masa pengiraan untuk memulihkan kunci rahsia, kami menjalankan simulasi serangan menggunakan PC. Keputusan simulasi menunjukkan bahawa kita boleh mendapatkan setiap kunci rahsia dalam masa tiga minit secara purata. Keputusan ini menunjukkan bahawa kita boleh mendapatkan keseluruhan kunci dalam masa pengiraan yang boleh dilaksanakan.
The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.
Salinan
Junko TAKAHASHI, Toshinori FUKUNAGA, "Differential Fault Analysis on CLEFIA with 128, 192, and 256-Bit Keys" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E93-A, no. 1, pp. 136-143, January 2010, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.136.
Abstract: This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) attack against CLEFIA. The proposed attack can be applied to CLEFIA with all supported keys: 128, 192, and 256-bit keys. DFA is a type of side-channel attack. This attack enables the recovery of secret keys by injecting faults into a secure device during its computation of the cryptographic algorithm and comparing the correct ciphertext with the faulty one. CLEFIA is a 128-bit blockcipher with 128, 192, and 256-bit keys developed by the Sony Corporation in 2007. CLEFIA employs a generalized Feistel structure with four data lines. We developed a new attack method that uses this characteristic structure of the CLEFIA algorithm. On the basis of the proposed attack, only 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts are needed to retrieve the 128-bit key, and 10.78 pairs on average are needed to retrieve the 192 and 256-bit keys. The proposed attack is more efficient than any previously reported. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time to recover the secret key, we conducted an attack simulation using a PC. The simulation results show that we can obtain each secret key within three minutes on average. This result shows that we can obtain the entire key within a feasible computational time.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E93.A.136/_p
Salinan
@ARTICLE{e93-a_1_136,
author={Junko TAKAHASHI, Toshinori FUKUNAGA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Differential Fault Analysis on CLEFIA with 128, 192, and 256-Bit Keys},
year={2010},
volume={E93-A},
number={1},
pages={136-143},
abstract={This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) attack against CLEFIA. The proposed attack can be applied to CLEFIA with all supported keys: 128, 192, and 256-bit keys. DFA is a type of side-channel attack. This attack enables the recovery of secret keys by injecting faults into a secure device during its computation of the cryptographic algorithm and comparing the correct ciphertext with the faulty one. CLEFIA is a 128-bit blockcipher with 128, 192, and 256-bit keys developed by the Sony Corporation in 2007. CLEFIA employs a generalized Feistel structure with four data lines. We developed a new attack method that uses this characteristic structure of the CLEFIA algorithm. On the basis of the proposed attack, only 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts are needed to retrieve the 128-bit key, and 10.78 pairs on average are needed to retrieve the 192 and 256-bit keys. The proposed attack is more efficient than any previously reported. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time to recover the secret key, we conducted an attack simulation using a PC. The simulation results show that we can obtain each secret key within three minutes on average. This result shows that we can obtain the entire key within a feasible computational time.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E93.A.136},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
Salinan
TY - JOUR
TI - Differential Fault Analysis on CLEFIA with 128, 192, and 256-Bit Keys
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 136
EP - 143
AU - Junko TAKAHASHI
AU - Toshinori FUKUNAGA
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.136
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E93-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2010
AB - This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) attack against CLEFIA. The proposed attack can be applied to CLEFIA with all supported keys: 128, 192, and 256-bit keys. DFA is a type of side-channel attack. This attack enables the recovery of secret keys by injecting faults into a secure device during its computation of the cryptographic algorithm and comparing the correct ciphertext with the faulty one. CLEFIA is a 128-bit blockcipher with 128, 192, and 256-bit keys developed by the Sony Corporation in 2007. CLEFIA employs a generalized Feistel structure with four data lines. We developed a new attack method that uses this characteristic structure of the CLEFIA algorithm. On the basis of the proposed attack, only 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts are needed to retrieve the 128-bit key, and 10.78 pairs on average are needed to retrieve the 192 and 256-bit keys. The proposed attack is more efficient than any previously reported. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time to recover the secret key, we conducted an attack simulation using a PC. The simulation results show that we can obtain each secret key within three minutes on average. This result shows that we can obtain the entire key within a feasible computational time.
ER -