The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Kami menunjukkan serangan penjejakan terhadap skim pemindahan ID terbaharu untuk teg RFID kos rendah. Dalam serangan ini, penyerang luas, iaitu penyerang yang boleh mengakses hasil pengesahan pelayan, dapat memalsukan satu set mesej tertentu dan menjejak tag. Serangan itu unik kerana ia melibatkan tiga sesi protokol. Akhir sekali, analisis kebolehlaksanaan mudah serangan diberikan.
The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.
Salinan
YuanYuan YANG, WenPing MA, WeiBo LIU, Qi JIANG, "Security Analysis of the Newest ID-Transfer Scheme for Low-Cost RFID Tags" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E93-A, no. 10, pp. 1837-1839, October 2010, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.1837.
Abstract: We show a tracking attack against the newest ID-transfer scheme for low-cost RFID tags. In this attack, a wide attacker, i.e. an attacker that can access the verification result of a server, is able to forge a set of specific messages, and to track a tag. The attack is unique as it involves three sessions of the protocol. Finally, a simple feasibility analysis of the attack is given.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E93.A.1837/_p
Salinan
@ARTICLE{e93-a_10_1837,
author={YuanYuan YANG, WenPing MA, WeiBo LIU, Qi JIANG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Security Analysis of the Newest ID-Transfer Scheme for Low-Cost RFID Tags},
year={2010},
volume={E93-A},
number={10},
pages={1837-1839},
abstract={We show a tracking attack against the newest ID-transfer scheme for low-cost RFID tags. In this attack, a wide attacker, i.e. an attacker that can access the verification result of a server, is able to forge a set of specific messages, and to track a tag. The attack is unique as it involves three sessions of the protocol. Finally, a simple feasibility analysis of the attack is given.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E93.A.1837},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={October},}
Salinan
TY - JOUR
TI - Security Analysis of the Newest ID-Transfer Scheme for Low-Cost RFID Tags
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1837
EP - 1839
AU - YuanYuan YANG
AU - WenPing MA
AU - WeiBo LIU
AU - Qi JIANG
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.1837
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E93-A
IS - 10
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - October 2010
AB - We show a tracking attack against the newest ID-transfer scheme for low-cost RFID tags. In this attack, a wide attacker, i.e. an attacker that can access the verification result of a server, is able to forge a set of specific messages, and to track a tag. The attack is unique as it involves three sessions of the protocol. Finally, a simple feasibility analysis of the attack is given.
ER -