The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Lelongan ialah elemen kritikal dalam infrastruktur perdagangan elektronik. Tetapi untuk aplikasi masa nyata, lelongan merupakan masalah yang berpotensi - ia boleh menyebabkan kelewatan masa yang ketara. Oleh itu, untuk kebanyakan aplikasi masa nyata, lelongan bida tertutup disyorkan. Tetapi bagaimana kita mengendalikan pemecahan seri dalam lelongan bidaan tertutup? Kertas kerja ini menganalisis penggunaan lelongan berbilang pusingan di mana pemenang daripada pusingan lelongan mengambil bahagian dalam pusingan lelongan kedua pecah seri berikutnya. Kami melakukan analisis ini ke atas lelongan bida tertutup harga pertama klasik yang telah diubah suai untuk memberikan kerahasiaan penuh. Kami menganalisis bilangan pusingan yang dijangkakan dan nilai optimum untuk meminimumkan kos komunikasi.
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Salinan
Hiroaki KIKUCHI, Michael HAKAVY, Doug TYGAR, "Multi-Round Anonymous Auction Protocols" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E82-D, no. 4, pp. 769-777, April 1999, doi: .
Abstract: Auctions are a critical element of the electronic commerce infrastructure. But for real-time applications, auctions are a potential problem - they can cause significant time delays. Thus, for most real-time applications, sealed-bid auctions are recommended. But how do we handle tie-breaking in sealed-bid auctions? This paper analyzes the use of multi-round auctions where the winners from an auction round participate in a subsequent tie-breaking second auction round. We perform this analysis over the classical first-price sealed-bid auction that has been modified to provide full anonymity. We analyze the expected number of rounds and optimal values to minimize communication costs.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/e82-d_4_769/_p
Salinan
@ARTICLE{e82-d_4_769,
author={Hiroaki KIKUCHI, Michael HAKAVY, Doug TYGAR, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Multi-Round Anonymous Auction Protocols},
year={1999},
volume={E82-D},
number={4},
pages={769-777},
abstract={Auctions are a critical element of the electronic commerce infrastructure. But for real-time applications, auctions are a potential problem - they can cause significant time delays. Thus, for most real-time applications, sealed-bid auctions are recommended. But how do we handle tie-breaking in sealed-bid auctions? This paper analyzes the use of multi-round auctions where the winners from an auction round participate in a subsequent tie-breaking second auction round. We perform this analysis over the classical first-price sealed-bid auction that has been modified to provide full anonymity. We analyze the expected number of rounds and optimal values to minimize communication costs.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={April},}
Salinan
TY - JOUR
TI - Multi-Round Anonymous Auction Protocols
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 769
EP - 777
AU - Hiroaki KIKUCHI
AU - Michael HAKAVY
AU - Doug TYGAR
PY - 1999
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN -
VL - E82-D
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - April 1999
AB - Auctions are a critical element of the electronic commerce infrastructure. But for real-time applications, auctions are a potential problem - they can cause significant time delays. Thus, for most real-time applications, sealed-bid auctions are recommended. But how do we handle tie-breaking in sealed-bid auctions? This paper analyzes the use of multi-round auctions where the winners from an auction round participate in a subsequent tie-breaking second auction round. We perform this analysis over the classical first-price sealed-bid auction that has been modified to provide full anonymity. We analyze the expected number of rounds and optimal values to minimize communication costs.
ER -